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Historically, many Christians have understood God’s transcendence to imply God’s properties categorically 
differ from any created properties. For multiple historical figures, a problem arose for religious language: 
how can one talk of God at all if none of our predicates apply to God? What are we to make of creeds 
and Biblical passages that seem to predicate creaturely properties, such as goodness and wisdom, of God? 
Thomas Aquinas offered a solution: God is to be spoken of only through analogy (the doctrine of  analogy). 
Gavin Hyman argues Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy was neglected prior to the early-modern period and 
the neglect of analogy produced the conception of a god vulnerable to atheistic arguments. Contra 
Hyman, in this paper, I show early-modern atheism arose in a theological context in which there was an 
active debate concerning analogy. Peter Browne (1665–1735) and William King (1650–1729) offered two 
competing conceptions of analogical predication that were debated through the 19th century, with inter-
locutors such as the freethinker Anthony Collins (1676–1729), theologian/philosopher George Berkeley 
(1685–1753), and skeptic David Hume (1711–1776). Lastly, I discuss the 18th century debate over 
theological analogy as part of the background relevant to understanding Hume’s Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion.
1. Introduction
According to Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), God tran-
scends all created categories (Turner 2004, 187–190). The 
terms native to human languages fail to describe God 
because human languages developed to discuss matters 
subsumed by created categories. God can only be referred 
to by analogy: the doctrine of analogy (herein: DOA) 
(see, for example, ST I, Q13, A5). Some theologians link 
a neglect of DOA to modern secularization. For example, 
Radical Orthodox theologians present a history according 
to which theological changes after Duns Scotus 
(1266–1308), in which God’s being came to be seen 
as  univocal – as opposed to analogical –with that of 
 creatures, eventually resulted in modern secularization 
(for an outline of this historical narrative, see chapter 3 
in (Smith 2004)). Richard Muller describes a related his-
torico-theological narrative as follows:
The Lortz thesis [. . .] claimed [. . .] Luther’s theo-
logical revolt was precipitated by the decadent 
theology and philosophy of the later Middle Ages, 
specifically the developments that took place 
after Duns Scotus [. . .]. With the Radical Orthodox 
writers [. . .] the thesis has become more focused 
on Scotus and his understanding of the univocity 
of being. According to their theses, Scotus’ under-
standing of univocity created a profound problem,  
identifying the being of God with the being of 
creatures but nonetheless placed at an infinite 
distance from them, undermining traditional 
teaching concerning divine transcendence. [. . .]  
This problematic theological and philosophi-
cal understanding then carried over wholesale 
into the Reformation, rendering Protestant theology  
highly flawed from the outset and, in the  version 
of the thesis espoused by [historian Brad]  Gregory, 
yielding a defective understanding of the rela-
tionship of God and world, reason and  theology, 
ultimately bringing about a new and highly 
 secularized worldview as an unintended result of 
the Reformation (Muller 2012).
Or, as James K.A. Smith describes, “Scotus’s shift away 
from a metaphysics of participation to an ontology predi-
cated on the univocity of being rent the cords of suspen-
sion that hooked the immanent to the transcendent, the 
material to the more than material. The result [. . .] was 
modernity’s ‘flattened ontology’, which eventually issued 
in nihilism” (Smith 2004, 93). Gavin Hyman takes Radi-
cal Orthodoxy’s historical explanation of secularization 
one step further and argues early modern atheism arose 
because of DOA’s prior neglect (Hyman 2007; 2010). 
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Other authors agree that the redescription of God as a 
being ushered in atheism: “The bringing about of God as 
a being means the bringing about of one who can also be 
declared to be dead” (Hemming 1999, 95).
Still other theologians posit a neglect in God’s tran-
scendence, as conceptualized in terms of theological anal-
ogy, resulted in an idolatrous conception of God atheists 
rightfully reject. As Paul Tillich describes, God, properly 
conceived, transcends the created order of beings and is 
not a being at all (Tillich 1951, 235–237). Common idola-
trous conceptions of God, Tillich argues, were the cause of 
modern atheism because they cannot serve our existen-
tial needs, lead to illiberal politics, and are susceptible to 
atheistic attacks (Tillich 1952, 182–185). Popular religious 
apologists, such as Karen Armstrong (2009), follow Tillich 
in asserting the modern rejection of God was due to the 
ascendancy of a false idol and the neglect of a pre-modern 
God concept. For both Hyman and Armstrong, specifi-
cally modern God concepts were prerequisite for the rise 
of New Atheism (e.g. the post-9/11 movement of aggres-
sive atheist authors as typified by authors like Richard 
Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens) over the 
past two decades.1
For Hyman, DOA’s neglect rendered atheism “almost 
inevitable” (Hyman 2007, 40). According to Hyman, prior 
to early modernity, God was reconceived as part of the 
creaturely realm instead of wholly Other:
“God is not only liable to appear incredible or 
unbelievable [. . .] but [. . .] as the world becomes 
more self-explanatory and self-sufficient, increasingly 
superﬂuous”. Reconceiving God as part of the  creaturely 
realm, and ﬁnding God does not ﬁt the creaturely 
realm, resulted in atheism (Hyman 2007, 43). In this 
paper, I put aside philosophical, normative, and theological 
questions and show, contra Hyman’s historical narrative, 
(a) anglophone theologians prior to and during the 
eighteenth century did not neglect DOA and (b) at least 
some of the eighteenth-century thinkers skeptical of 
religion responded to the debates over theological  analogy. 
Furthermore, eighteenth-century critics of  religion 
 incorporated concerns about theological analogy in their 
irreligious arguments.
First, I distinguish between two forms of DOA as 
they appear in Aquinas’s works: the analogy of propor-
tion (AOP1) and the analogy of proportionality (AOP2). 
Aquinas sided with AOP2. As I show, AOP2 was not 
neglected in the anglophone context in early modernity. 
I examine a debate over the nature of DOA and show the 
debate was directed to and influential on freethinkers 
and skeptics such as philosopher/freethinker Anthony 
Collins (1676–1729) and Scottish philosopher David 
Hume (1711–1776). 
2. Aquinas’s DOA
Aquinas distinguishes three modes of predication: equiv-
ocal, univocal, and analogical. Creaturely predicates are 
those predicates that apply to objects or beings in the 
created order, i.e., “good”, “bad”, “blue”, “right-handed”, 
“square”, and so on. In equivocal predication, creaturely 
predicates do not apply to God. But if creaturely  predicates 
do not apply to God, one cannot use human languages – 
which, according to Aquinas, contain only creaturely 
predicates – to speak meaningfully about God. On the 
other hand, if one applies creaturely predicates to God (as 
in univocal predication between God and creatures), then 
one is anthropomorphizing God and the result is idola-
trous (ST I, Q13, A5 6). Aquinas suggests we should apply 
predicates to God analogically as a mean between the two 
(ST I, Q13, A5).
 The two kinds of analogy – AOP1 and AOP2 – result 
from two corresponding conceptions of proportion. 
Sometimes, we say that there is a proportion between 
two objects in virtue of, for example, their relative sizes. 
A one centimeter by one centimeter portrait of George 
Washington can be said to be in proportion to a five meter 
by five meter poster of George Washington. Both pictures, 
while of different sizes, are not of different kinds. If crea-
tures are related to God in virtue of AOP1, then God is 
an infinitely amplified version of a creature. Thus, if DOA 
is understood in terms of AOP1, then God’s intellect (for 
example) is an infinitely amplified intellect of the same 
kind as those of creatures. However, another way of tak-
ing about proportion relates objects of two fundamentally 
different kinds. For example, there is a correspondence 
between a painting of a pipe and a pipe. For AOP2, God’s 
properties are of a different kind from those of creatures. 
Aquinas rejected AOP1, arguing that there can be no pro-
portion between the created intellect and God’s uncre-
ated intellect because the former is finite while the latter 
infinite (SS, IV, d49, q49, q2, a1). More generally, Aquinas 
maintained there is no proportion between creaturely 
and Divine properties. However, there can be an analogy 
between God and creatures in another way: AOP2, where 
a comparison between two things is identified with a com-
parison between two other things (SS, IV, d49, q2, a1). For 
example:
feet : shoes :: hands : gloves
Similarly, Aquinas argued the relationship between crea-
tures and their properties can be identified with the rela-
tionship between God and His properties:
creature : intellect :: God : Intellect
The difference in meaning of the term “Intellect” when 
applied to God and when applied to creatures has been sig-
nified with the use of the capital /I/. In Hyman’s account, 
early modern philosophers and theologians reified God 
and reduced God’s transcendence “to such an extent that 
[God] becomes a ‘thing’ himself” (Hyman 2007, 38–39.). 
According to Hyman, philosophers and theologians com-
mitted the ontotheological error: mistakenly understand-
ing God to have the same kind of being (ens) as creatures, 
when God transcends all created categories, including 
being (Adams 2014, 1–12; Turner 2004, 26–29, 187–190). 
Aquinas argues instead for the analogia entis, or the anal-
ogy of being, according to which being cannot be predi-
cated univocally of God and creatures (Muller 2012, 135). 
For Hyman, ontotheology leaves theism vulnerable to 
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atheological attacks. Failing to ﬁnd either God or 
justiﬁcation for God in the world, atheism appeared 
“almost irresistible” (Hyman 2007, 43).
Hyman’s claim is contrary to Richard Muller’s recent 
scholarship on early-modern theology (Muller 2012). 
Muller has identified 20 reformed theologians from across 
Europe who denied the univocity of being between 1590 
and 1700, many of whom either affirmed or responded 
to the analogia entis. Five of the 20 reformed theolo-
gians Muller identifies lived in the anglophone context 
(Richard Crakanthorpe (1567– 1624), William Twisse 
(1578–1646), Thomas Barlow (1607–1691), Theophilus 
Gale (1628–1678), and Robert Baron (1593?–1639) 
(Muller 2012, 129). Furthermore, orthodox theologians 
engaging freethinking authors in the anglophone context 
continued to reference DOA into the eighteenth century. 
In the next section, I show that an eighteenth-century 
debate over DOA in the anglophone context references 
the analogia entis and was directed to and influential on 
freethinking authors.
3. The DOA in the Eighteenth-Century 
Anglophone Context
The Spanish Jesuit theologian Francisco Suárez 
(1548–1617) revived the seventeenth-century debate 
over theological analogy by arguing for the univocity of 
being (Muller 2012, 129; Armogothe 2012, 309). Several 
theologians throughout Europe responded critically to 
Suárez (Muller 2012). By the start of the eighteenth cen-
tury, the debate over theological analogy had become 
widespread. French Huguenot philosopher Pierre 
Bayle (1647–1706) states in his Dictionnaire Historique 
et Critique he “formerly examined this Dispute [over the 
analogy of being], which is very famous in the Schools” 
and “[t]hey, who deny the Univocation of Being, have the 
Crowd, the Many, on their Side” (Bayle 1734, 488. Eng-
lish translation). In 1728, English encyclopedist Ephraim 
Chambers (1680–1740) wrote (emphasis in the original) 
“[t]he schoolmen have long disputed about the uni-
vocaton of being, i.e. whether the general idea of being 
agree in the same manner, and in the same sense, to the 
substance and the accident; to God, and the creature?” 
(Chambers 1728, 325).
For Bayle and Chambers, the dispute over theological 
analogy and its relation to being was live, ongoing, wide-
spread, active throughout the first part of the eighteenth 
century, and most importantly for my purposes, hardly 
neglected. Furthermore, while Bayle’s status as a clandes-
tine atheist has long been disputed, Bayle’s influence on 
early modern critics of religion is not contested (Lennon 
2014; Heyd 1977, 157–165; Berman 2013, 159–162.).
At the start of the eighteenth century, the anglophone 
theological debate over DOA centered on two Irish theo-
logians: William King (1650–1729) and Peter Browne 
(166?–1735). From the beginning of the eighteenth 
century to at least the mid nineteenth century, the the-
ological positions first articulated by King and Browne 
formed two competing theological conceptions of DOA 
(Buchanan 1864, 10). In what follows, I describe King and 
Browne’s respective theological programs.
King’s Theological Program
The Problem of Evil asks how God, if all powerful and 
perfectly good, could create and maintain a world con-
taining evil. Bayle composed a dialogue in the foot-
notes of his Historical Dictionary in which one charac-
ter argues Manichaeism – the view that there exist two 
gods, equally powerful, one of which is evil and the other 
good – is a better explanation of our world’s mixture of 
good and evil than traditional theism. On a literal read-
ing, Bayle uses his character’s argument as justification 
to doubt the human mind’s ability to reason about the 
Divine. Manichaeism is false, Bayle says, but one would 
have concluded Manichaeism were true if one incorrectly 
attempted to use Reason in place of Faith (Bayle 1734, 95). 
Radical fideism is the view that one should rely on faith in 
place of reason. Logically, the arguments Bayle presents 
for radical fideism entail atheism or other  unorthodox 
views (i.e. Manichaeism); for this reason, Bayle’s 
response to the Problem of Evil did not sit well with the 
 theologically conservative King.
King delivered his 1709 sermon, Divine Predestination 
and Foreknowledge, Consistent with the Freedom of Man’s 
will, partially in response to Bayle. In the sermon, King uses 
his conception of theological analogy to sidestep a num-
ber of arguments he thought threatening to Christendom 
(King, 1709). For King, God’s properties bear an analo-
gous similarity to those of humans, while atheistic argu-
ments mistakenly assume God’s properties to be univocal 
with those of humans. For example, the problem of evil 
assumes God’s goodness is an infinitely magnified version 
of creaturely goodness, so that we can know God would 
be unlikely to make a universe with evil by reflecting on 
creaturely goodness. However, as King points out, God’s 
properties are unlikely to be like creaturely properties.
On King’s view, when the Bible describes God as having 
various limbs, the Bible should not be understood as say-
ing the same as is meant when we say humans have limbs. 
Biblical limb-talk should be understood analogically. The 
same is true for other properties of God; just as God lacks 
limbs, so too God literally lacks foreknowledge, goodness, 
and a number of other attributes one might have other-
wise literally ascribed to God. God possesses properties 
merely analogous to those of creatures which one might 
call divine foreknowledge and goodness. Since God’s 
properties only bear an analogical similarity to those of 
humans, we should not expect God to behave as a per-
fectly good human, who possessed foreknowledge, would 
behave; humanly goodness – even if infinitely perfect  – 
would remain categorically distinct from God’s. Thus, King 
concludes, Manichaeism, and other unorthodox positions, 
do not explain our world better than traditional Christian 
theism.
On King’s account, any apparent inconsistency between 
the appearance of the world – such as the existence of 
suffering – and God’s attributes – such as God’s goodness – 
is illusory. Thus, according to King, the thought that God 
would not allow suffering in the world because God is 
infinitely good is mistaken (King 1709, 4–10). God does 
not literally possess goodness and whatever property God 
possesses, analogous to goodness, may or may not allow 
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for suffering. We cannot understand God’s properties, 
so any argument opposing theism on the basis of God’s 
properties is, on King’s account, mistaken. As Collins sum-
marized King’s position, “[...] no Man [sic] can object to he 
knows not what, all Objections supposing a meaning to 
the Proposition objected against” (Collins 1710, 11).
From the perspective of many of his contemporar-
ies, King confused analogy with metaphor.2 As Browne 
explained, metaphor is purely the result of the human 
mind, while analogy “is the Result of Reason viewing the 
True Nature of Beings”. For Browne, when we say God 
possesses limbs, we are speaking metaphorically but not 
analogically: metaphors are “an Appearing or Imaginary 
Resemblance and Correspondency” (Browne 1734). Thus, 
to say God is analogically good, in King’s sense, involves 
denying God is good at all.
Collins responded directly to King, and in defense of 
those skeptical or critical of religion,3 in his Vindication 
of Divine Attributes in 1710. As Collins maintains, King’s 
version of analogy renders natural theology impossible. 
A consequence of the impossibility of natural theology is 
the impossibility of proving the existence of God through 
evidence of design in nature.4 For Collins, King’s account 
of analogy leaves us no conception at all of God’s prop-
erties, rendering “religion” impossible.5 Collins concludes 
King’s sermon was nothing more than a tacit acceptance 
of defeat. On one interpretation of Bayle’s arguments, if 
God exists then either God does not have foreknowledge 
or humans do not possess free will. In King’s response, God 
possessed a property merely “analogous”, in King’s sense, 
to foreknowledge; to Collins, this read as King conceding 
God’s lack of foreknowledge. From Collins’s perspective, 
we should not call a being without foreknowledge “God”. 
Likewise for goodness: if King’s God is not literally good, 
then in what sense is King’s deity God? Collins proceeds to 
argue King’s conception of God destroys both the project 
of natural theology and of religion generally, leaving the 
Christian little room in which to stand.
For Collins, King’s conception of God destroyed natural 
theology because theism could no longer be proven from 
evidence of design in nature. King is unable to prove the 
existence of God, Collins argued, due to the radical seman-
tic underdetermination of “God”; all King could possibly 
mean by “God” is a “General Cause of Effects” (Collins 
1710, 13). Collins states: “if that be all that is meant by the 
term [‘God’], I see not why Atheists should not come into 
the Belief of such a Deity; for they, equally with Theists, 
allow some general Cause of all Effects to have eternally 
existed; but [. . .] differ from them in the Attributes of 
that general Cause” (Collins 1710, 13–14). According 
to Collins, King, and other theists, cannot provide any 
further “King’s account seemed to entail that any attempt 
to refer to God’s attributes would fail, leaving theism 
without substance. King’s conception of God destroys the 
project of religion generally, Collins maintained, because 
one cannot prove, from such vague conceptions of God, 
that one should worship God, that there is an afterlife, or 
that there was once a human who was fully God and died 
for our sins.
Browne’s Theological Program
Browne advocated a view of theological analogy in which 
humans and God have more in common than they do 
in King’s view. Nonetheless, Browne, like King, asserts 
we cannot know what the term “goodness” means when 
applied to God (Browne 1733, 82) and cites Aquinas for 
support (Browne 1733, 84). For Browne, God’s properties 
are inexpressible in creaturely languages and this finds its 
clearest expression in Aquinas’s works: “But of all whom I 
have yet met with, the Angelic Doctor [Aquinas] hath set 
this whole Matter in the truest Light” (Browne 1733, 93). 
After explaining Aquinas’s distinction between univocal 
and equivocal predication, denying that each of these hold 
between God and creatures, Browne explicates Thomistic 
analogical predication  (i.e. AOP2) and asserts God’s prop-
erties may only be predicated analogically of God and 
creatures. Browne then discusses analogical predication 
in relation to Aquinas’s distinction between essence and 
existence (Browne 1733, 93–96).
Browne’s fame was owed to a response he wrote to deist 
John Toland (1670–1722) entitled A Letter in Answer to 
a Book Entitled Christianity not Mysterious (published in 
1692). Later, Browne responded to other heretical views, 
each time utilizing DOA in defense of  Christian ortho-
doxy.6 Browne’s student, philosopher and Bishop George 
Berkeley (1685–1753), answered the debate between King 
and Collins in chapter IV of his Alciphron or: The Minute 
Philosopher A Defence of the Christian Religion against the 
So-called Free-thinkers (1732), in which the titular char-
acter represents Collins.7 For Berkeley, analogy had come 
to be seen as a weapon of the atheists. Berkeley argues 
that the atheistic weaponization of analogy is based on a 
misunderstanding of analogy and the use of AOP2 would 
disarm the atheists.
The admission that God exists, while failing to admit 
any of God’s properties, is the admission only that there 
is some object or other that one calls “God” and not the 
admission that the object has any particular description. 
But, without any particular description, the object in ques-
tion could be any object whatsoever, including objects the 
atheist readily admits to exist. One of Berkeley’s characters 
is a religious skeptic who advances Collins’s argument in 
order to show that admitting the existence of God is not 
admitting much at all. An admission to God’s existence 
grants the existence of God in only an “indefinite sense”, in 
which God is understood to “properly speaking, [have] no 
knowledge or wisdom at all”. That is, following Collins, the 
skeptic maintains only that there is some object one could 
arbitrarily call “God” (if one so chose) and not that the 
object possesses any of the divine attributes. Berkeley’s 
skeptic goes on to explain that such conceptions entail 
disastrous consequences for natural theology, as very little 
can be shown from attributes that are either unknown or 
possessed in an unknown sense. Berkeley’s skeptic con-
cludes: “Since, therefore, nothing can be inferred from 
such an account of God, about conscience, or worship, or 
religion, you may even make the best of it. And, not to be 
singular, we will use the name too, and so at once there is 
an end of atheism” (Berkeley 1732, 248–249).
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One of Berkeley’s theistic characters responds that 
skeptics have misunderstood DOA. According to the char-
acter, if DOA is understood as Aquinas described – using 
proportionality – then the semantic underdetermination 
evaporates. Berkeley’s theist proceeds through a history of 
DOA referencing both Aquinas and Suárez. Berkeley’s the-
ist notes, in a proper theological understanding of anal-
ogy, being – or existence – is analogical and not univocal 
between God and creatures (the analogia entis):
At that time the scholastics generally held that even 
Being should be attributed to God and to created 
things only analogically. That is, they held that God—
the supreme, independent, self-causing cause and 
source of all beings—mustn’t be supposed to exist 
in the same sense of “exist” as that in which created 
beings exist; not that he exists less truly or properly 
than they do, but only that he exists in a more emi-
nent and perfect manner (Berkeley 1732, 255).
Lastly, against those who, like King, confuse analogical 
predication and metaphor, Berkeley distinguishes “meta-
phorical analogy” (e.g. equivocal predication) and “proper 
analogy” (AOP2), noting that DOA should be understood 
in terms of the latter (Berkeley 1732, 257).
Hume Enters Stage Left
While Hume has been variously interpreted as an agnostic 
(Noxon 1966), irreligious (Russell 2008), a skeptic (Price 
1965), and a deist (Gaskin 1978), Hyman maintains Hume 
“dispens[ed] with God altogether” (Hyman 2010, 36). At 
times, in agreement with Noxon, Hyman describes Hume 
as an agnostic and not an atheist. Nonetheless, Hyman 
is explicit that, whatever Hume’s views were, Hume was 
not a theist. In what follows, I follow Hyman in assuming 
Hume was a non-theist whose arguments lend themselves 
to atheistic conclusions. Unlike Hyman, I will examine 
Hume’s engagement with theological analogy and reli-
gious language. Importantly, as I demonstrate, Hume’s 
engagement with the King/Browne/Berkeley exchange 
was important in Hume’s irreligiosity. I will conclude, con-
tra Hyman, the neglect of analogy cannot explain the rise 
of early-modern anglophone atheism.
Hume maintains a tension throughout his Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion between “anthropomorphite” 
theology, according to which God’s properties differ only 
in magnitude, and not in kind, from those of creatures, 
and a theology according to which God is completely 
beyond human understanding and categorically distinct 
from creatures. The former seems necessary for inferring 
God’s existence from evidence of design in nature. After 
all, when one infers nature was produced by an infinitely 
wise being for particular ends, one compares God to 
humans. However, the latter seems necessary for main-
taining a traditional notion of God’s transcendence. The 
tension can be understood in terms of its implications 
for religious language: the god inferred through design 
arguments is one whose properties are univocal with crea-
turely properties. To render God more transcendent is to 
render the predicates applied to God and creatures ever 
more equivocal.
Hume’s Dialogues involve three characters: Philo, the 
skeptic (often understood to represent Hume), Demea, 
the mystical theist and pietist, and Cleanthes, who pre-
sents design arguments for God’s existence. Demea 
and Philo accuse Cleanthes of “anthropomorphitism” 
while Cleanthes and Philo accuse Demea of presenting 
God as so radically transcendent as to render theism 
indistinct from atheism. Towards the close of part III, 
Cleanthes presents a design argument, citing the intri-
cate way in which each part of nature is fit for another, 
so that even the sexes were designed for each other 
(Hume 1947, 154).
Demea responds that Cleanthes presents a strong 
argument, but at the cost of reducing God’s transcend-
ence: “it must be acknowledged, that, by representing 
the Deity as so intelligible and comprehensible, and so 
similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the grossest 
and most narrow partiality” (Hume 1947, 156). Demea 
explains God forms an incomprehensible unity, so that 
God cannot be subdivided in terms of His properties 
(divine Simplicity). Thus, none of God’s properties are 
univocal with those of humans, whose properties, unlike 
God’s, are not identical to their essence (Hume 1947, 
158). In response, Cleanthes argues divine simplicity is 
tantamount to atheism because an incomprehensible 
timeless unity is not capable of performing acts or hav-
ing sentiments, successive ideas, thoughts, reason, will, 
love, hatred, or even a mind because all of these proper-
ties require time and constitution. To describe an incom-
prehensible, timeless unity as God would be an “abuse of 
terms” (Hume 1947, 159).
However, divine Simplicity was important for Aquinas’s 
conception of theological analogy. For Aquinas, one rea-
son we require theological analogy to talk about God is 
that creatures possess their properties in a fundamentally 
different way than God possesses His properties. Aquinas 
argues that God is Simple, by which he means that all 
of God’s properties are identical to God’s essence. There 
is no distinction between God’s Being (ens) and God’s 
Essence (esse) (ST P1 Q3, especially article 4). However, 
humans’, and other creatures’, properties are distinct 
from their essence, so, in creatures, there is a distinction 
between ens and esse. On Aquinas’s view, God’s essence is 
incomprehensible to the created intellect in the present 
life and, consequently, the manner of God’s existence is 
incomprehensible to the created intellect in the present 
life. Hume’s Demea agrees and notes that, “the manner 
of [God’s] existence” is “mysterious” to “[f]inite, weak, and 
blind creatures” (Hume 1947, 141). 
Thus, by rendering incoherent one reason that God-
talk might be analogical, Cleanthes’s argument contra 
Simplicity indirectly undermines theological analogy. As 
Philo indicates, Cleanthes painted all of the “orthodox 
divines” as atheists and has painted himself as the only 
orthodox individual in the world (Hume 1947, 159). In any 
case, if, as Hyman argues, we interpret Hume as a non-
theist, then Hume’s rejection of God involved Hume’s 
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reaction to theological analogy and not, as Hyman con-
tends, because theological analogy had never been made 
available to him due to prior neglect.
Elsewhere, Hume continues the theme of identifying 
a radically transcendent God with no god at all. Several 
commentators have noticed a strong similarity between 
Hume’s argument in chapter XII of Dialogues and chapter 
IV of Berkeley’s Alciphron.8 In that chapter, Philo argues 
that there is only a verbal distinction between atheism 
and theism.
Philo begins by posing a question for theists: do they 
allow a “great and immeasurable, because incomprehen-
sible difference between the human the divine mind”? 
The more pious the theist wishes to be, the more they 
will commit themselves to God’s radical transcendence. 
Turning next to the atheist, Philo asks whether atheists 
disallow that the “rotting of a turnip, the generation of an 
animal, and the structure of human thought” could “bear 
some remote analogy to each other”. Philo imagines athe-
ists will answer in the affirmative without hesitation. Philo 
asks whether there could not be “some remote inconceiv-
able analogy” between what Unknowable Thing caused 
the universe and “the other operations of nature”, includ-
ing “human mind and thought”. Because any two things 
have some similarity or other between them, to deny that 
whatever created the universe possessed something or 
other analogous to a mind would be absurd. Thus, the 
dispute between theists and atheists has been dissolved: 
there is no distinction between theism and atheism after 
all (Hume 1947, 217).
Philo goes on to consider those who believe the “whole 
of Natural Theology” has been reduced to “one simple, 
though somewhat ambiguous” or “at least undefined 
proposition”: “That the cause or causes of order in the 
universe probably bear some remote analogy to human 
intelligence”. Philo states the conclusion is inevitable 
and cannot be avoided, but does not amount to much. 
Assenting to some remote Something or Other bearing a 
vague analogy to a mind may be “the first and most essen-
tial step towards being a sound, believing Christian”, but 
the Christianity assented to is not obviously distinct from 
atheism.9
4. Conclusion
Gavin Hyman argues early modern atheism arose due to a 
neglect of theological analogy. I have argued that in fact 
religious skeptics broadly discussed and debated theo-
logical analogy. Browne, King, and Berkeley, each a promi-
nent theologian of the period, used the doctrine in their 
defense of what they understood as orthodoxy. Even the 
irreligious Hume addressed theological analogy, arguing 
that it rendered atheism and theism only verbally distinct. 
Thus, Hyman’s explanation of the appearance of atheism 
in modernity as a result of a prior neglect of DOA is with-
out support. Several questions remain. In what follows, 
I offer several brief suggestions for future work.
Although early-modern irreligious figures did not 
neglect theological analogy, twentieth-century ana-
lytic philosophers have largely neglected the analogy of 
being. Philosopher Kris McDaniel describes the “apparent 
consensus among contemporary analytic metaphysicians 
is that believing [. . .] things can exist in different ways 
[e.g. the analogy of being] is silly or confused” (McDaniel 
2010, 689). As McDaniel notes, analytic philosophers 
after Quine have generally maintained existence is what-
ever the existential quantifier denotes and so is univocal. 
Religious disbelief is common among analytic philoso-
phers (Bourget & Chalmers 2014) and those pursuing a 
revised version of Hyman’s historical narrative may ask 
whether analytic philosophy’s anglophone hegemony, 
with the associated univocity of being, is responsible for 
the rise of atheism among contemporary philosophers. 
Moreover, one may ask how the rise of atheism among 
anglophone philosophers affects the rise of the non- 
religious and the secular in the broader culture. (I take no 
position on this issue here.)
Future work may be done to explore the relationship 
between analytic philosophy’s anglophone ascendance 
and the genealogy of the univocity of being. For exam-
ple, Kant’s response to Anselm’s ontological argument – 
that existence is not a predicate – was incorporated 
into Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic as the existential 
quantifier (Labenz 2006). Frege’s definition of the exis-
tential quantifier influenced Quine’s work and thereby 
late twentieth-century analytic metaphysicians. How 
did Quine’s work on existential quantification influence 
analytic philosophy of religion or the cultural debates 
over God’s existence? Few authors have engaged these 
questions.
The influence of Quine and other analytic metaphysi-
cians on most New Atheist authors is far from obvious 
(Daniel Dennett excepted). However, some debate over the 
efficacy of Richard Dawkins’s central atheistic argument 
in The God Delusion has centered on Dawkins’s supposed 
lack of theological sophistication. Dawkins considers 
Creationist arguments that ask whether a random process – 
like a tornado plowing through a junkyard – would be 
likely to produce a Boeing 747. As Creationists point out, 
the odds are vastly opposed to junkyard tornados sponta-
neously assembling aircraft; so, the argument continues, 
natural processes are even more unlikely to produce living 
things, themselves vastly more complex than a Boeing 747. 
Dawkins agrees; natural processes are unlikely to produce 
life, but God is even less likely to exist since God must 
be even more complex than His Creation (Dawkins 2008, 
137–139). Critics say Dawkins has misunderstood (or 
failed to respond to) the most sophisticated conceptions 
of God, in which God is Simple. While Dawkins neglects 
divine simplicity, Hume did not. Analytic philosopher Erik 
Wielenberg argues atheists and theists alike should put 
down Dawkins and pick up Hume’s Dialogues, in which, as 
I explained in section 3, Hume argues against the coher-
ency of a Simple God (Wielenberg, 2009).
Nonetheless, whether Dawkins should have considered 
a Simple God is unclear; God’s Simplicity is notoriously 
difficult to make sense of and, if McDaniel is correct, ana-
lytic philosophers are likely to consider conceptions of 
God that utilize Simplicity (especially if taken to entail the 
doctrine of analogy) “silly or confused” (McDaniel 2010, 
689). Daniel Dennett, a more philosophically sophisticated 
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New Atheist than Dawkins, considers the view that God 
is beyond being tantamount to atheism (Dennett 2010). 
Similarly, as Mikael Stenmark observes, analytic philoso-
phers of religion, whether atheists or theists, commonly 
retort that a God beyond being is nonsense (Stenmark 
2015, 5); however, Stenmark (2015) makes inroads towards 
bringing into dialogue those who endorse and those who 
deny the analogy of being. Whether Stenmark’s attempt is 
successful is, as yet, unclear.
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Notes
 1 Theologian Michael Buckley offers another view 
according to which the early modern neglect of impor-
tant theological doctrines resulted in atheism. For 
Buckley, the neglect of Christology, instead of analogy, 
resulted in the rejection of Christianity (Buckley 1987). 
An analysis of Buckley’s thesis is beyond the scope of 
this paper.
 2 Aquinas covers this issue in ST 1 Q13 A3 and his com-
ments mirror Browne’s. Analogical predication is lit-
eral, not metaphorical, even though the meaning of 
terms when applied to God is incomprehensible to the 
created intellect.
 3 Whether Collins himself was an atheist is unclear, but 
see chapter 3 in Berman (1988).
 4 However, Collins’s argument is more general – and 
damning for King’s theism – than simply showing 
that natural theology is impossible. The implication of 
Collins’s pamphlet seems to be that it is impossible to 
prove anything about King’s God (including through 
the use of a priori reasoning) due to the kind of radical 
underdetermination in King’s view.
 5 In this context, the term “religion” is used in actor’s 
categories (Collins 1710).
 6 The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Under-
standing in 1728 and Divine Analogy, or Things Divine 
and Supernatural Conceived by Analogy with Things 
Natural and Human in 1733.
 7 The claim that Berkeley’s character Alciphron should 
be identified with Collins is from Berman (1993, 10).
 8 See, for example, Berman’s (1993, 5–6).
 9 Paul Russell describes Hume’s assent to theism, as a 
vague assent to Something or Other, “thin theism”, 
as distinguished from the theologically thick theism 
of orthodox religion (2010, 282–283). Although 
Russell argues Hume’s orientation is best described as 
irreligious (ibid, 279–300) – as opposed to an atheist 
or an agnostic – his interpretation of Hume’s views is 
 compatible with the one I offered in this paper.
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